Abstract: A comprehensive theory of large strategic games with (socioeconomic and biological) traits (LSGT ) has recently been presented in Khan et al. (2012 a and b), and in this paper, we present a reformulation pertaining to large distributional games with traits (LDGT ). In addition to a generalization of work initiated and advocated by Mas-Colell (1984) , we delineate the role of saturated spaces, as studied in Keisler-Sun (2009) , in the reformulated theory, and consider questions pertaining to "realizations" of equilibrium distributions that were not previously asked.
Introduction
The theory of large non-atomic games in strategic form has by now gone well beyond Schmeidler's (1973) framework in which a player's choice among a finite number of actions depends on a statistical summary, be it an average or a distribution, of the plays of everyone else in the game. Recent work of Khan et al. (2012a and b) has offered a rich but analytically tractable framework for game-theoretic situations in which the payoffs of the non-denumerable number of players depend not only on the actions chosen by other players but also on underlying characteristics of the players themselves, be they socioeconomic or biological.
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The resulting theory does not conflate names and traits, and with these separated out, goes beyond existence of pure-strategy equilibria to obtain comprehensive results on the continuity, asymptotic implementation and ex-post characterizations of such equilibria. However, the theory requires the jettisoning of the Lebesgue interval as the space of player-names in favor of so-called saturated measure spaces; indeed it offers a characterization of such spaces.
A decade subsequent to Schmeidler's paper, Mas-Colell (1984) proposed the jettisoning of the space of player-names altogether, and presented a "reformalization ... in terms of distributions rather than measurable functions." He emphasized the simplicity of his conception.
We shall see how once the definitions are available we get a (pure strategy) equilibrium existence theorem quite effortlessly and under general conditions . . . Because of (insubstantial) measurability problems an a priori given representation of the game is thus a sort of straightjacket. The approach via distributions frees one from it. This accounts for its comparative ease.
Indeed, if one invokes the identity map and sees a player's name also as his characteristic, it is now well-understood that in a setting with finite actions, Mas-Colell's theorem is an almost trivial consequence of that of Schmeidler, and it is only in more general contexts that the process of symmetrization, as opposed to purification, can be exploited, and connections with the "marriage lemma" and "disintegrations" made, resulting in the distributional approach coming into its own.
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In any case, the variant has attracted both theoretical and applied interest, and the two approaches, one based on a random variable and the other on its law, are simply complementary ways of looking at a large game, two sides of the same coin.
With this view of the antecedent background literature, the following questions naturally suggest themselves: (i) What shape does the theory of large strategic games with traits (henceforth LSGT ), with its informationally-richer notion of agent interdependence, take when recast for large distributional games with traits (henceforth LDGT )?
(ii) What role does the notion of a saturated probability space play in this reformulated theory?
We answer each of these questions here in a way that has the satisfying feature that it recovers previous results simply by the the specialization of the separable metric space of traits to a singleton! And to be sure, writing two and half decades after Mas-Colell, we can rely on previous advances and bring to bear heavier mathematical artillery to resolve questions that he did not address. All in all, the results bear testimony not only to the simplicity but the fecundity of Mas-Colell's conception. This letter is then organized as follows. Section 1 introduces saturated spaces and uses them to record an antecedent result on LSGT, Proposition 1. Section 2 turns to LDGT and presents the necessary definitions of the game, the Nash and symmetric Nash equilibrium distributions of the game, N ED and symmetric N ED, the realization of these distributions and their closed graph property. Section 3 presents the results. Theorem 1 and 2 generalize the corresponding results on N ED in Mas-Colell (1984) and Khan-Sun (1995) . The other results represent the extended reach of the theory: Theorem 3 is on the closed graph property of a NED correspondence; Proposition 2, Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 are results on Lebesgue and saturated realizations of N ED, symmetric and non-symmetric. The proofs of these results are all in keeping with Mas-Colell's original conception -they are natural and effortless consequences of Keisler-Sun (2009) and Khan et al. (2012a) once the necessary definitions are in place.
Large Strategic Games with Traits (LSGT )
The principal motivation behind the development of LSGT is the need for a rich space of player characteristics, embodied in a universal space of traits T, a complete separable metrizable (Polish) space, and a particular distribution ρ on the induced Borel σ-algebra B(T ) on this space. The resulting "externality" notion then embraces both distributions on T and the common action set A assumed to be compact metric. This involves M(T × A), the space of probability distributions on the Borel product σ-algebra on T × A, and its subspace M ρ (T × A) of distributions whose marginal distribution on T is ρ. The space of players' payoffs V (A,T,ρ) is then given by the space of all continuous functions on the product space A × M ρ (T × A), and endowed with its resulting Borel σ-algebra induced by the sup-norm topology. It is the measurable space (V (A,T,ρ) , B(V (A,T,ρ) )). The space of players' names (I, I, λ), an atomless probability space, thus does not figure as part of the players' characteristics. We can now present a formulation of a LSGT as follows.
In order to develop a general result on the existence of a Nash equilibria in LSGT, we need the notion of a saturated space as a formalization of the space of player-names.
Definition 2. A probability space is said to be countably-generated if its σ-algebra can be generated by a countable number of subsets together with the null sets; otherwise, it is not countably-generated. A probability space (I, I, λ) is saturated if it is nowhere countablygenerated, in the sense that, for any subset S ∈ I with λ(S) > 0, the restricted probability From the above definition, it is clear that saturated probability spaces must be atomless. An important property of saturated spaces is with respect to the saturation property defined below and encapsulated in a fact due to Hoover-Keisler and available in Keisler-Sun (2009) . 
Large Distributional Games with Traits (LDGT )
We now turn to the formulation where the space of player-names is suppressed, and rather than measurable functions, the focus shifts to their distributions.
, and if τ (B τ ) = 1 where
and τ T ×A is the marginal of τ on T × A. Next, we offer a definition of the closed graph property of the N ED correspondence. Finally, we present the notion of a realization of a N ED, studied in Keisler-Sun (2009) .
It is of interest to examine if players with identical characteristics (identical trait and identical payoff function) take an identical action in a N ED.
In addition to it being of interest in its own right, it plays an essential role in the proofs. 3 In previous work, this resulting game form LDGT was referred to as a "large anonymous game," and its equilibrium distribution referred to as a CN ED.
The Results and their Proofs
We first provide the existence result of a N ED in a LDGT . It is worth emphasizing that (like Proposition 1 (ii)), we do not need to impose any cardinality requirement on T or A for this existence result.
Theorem 1. There exists a N ED for any LDGT.
Proof: Let µ ρ be an LDGT and (I, I, λ) be a saturated probability space. As (I, I, λ) must be atomless, it is known that there exists an I-measurable mapping G : I → T × V (A,T,ρ) such that λG 
As µ ρ is atomless, by Bollobás and Varopoulos's marriage lemma, as used in Khan-Sun (1995) , there exists a disjoint family {V t,a } (t,a)∈T ×A of sets in B(T × V (A,T,ρ) 
It is easy to check that the measure µ
is the required symmetrization where i d is the identity mapping on T × V (A,T,ρ) . We now show that when an LDGT is atomless, the Lebesuge unit interval (L, L, ) plays the essential rule to determine if a N ED of the LDGT is symmetric or not. With the saturated property studied in Keisler-Sun (2009) , we now give a characterization result of a symmetric N ED in an atomless LDGT . This also extends Noguchi (2009, Theorem 2) where there is no formulation of traits and the common action set is uncountable.
Theorem 4. The following two conditions are equivalent for any N ED τ of an atomless
Proof: We first prove that (ii) implies (i). Let τ be a symmetric N ED of LDGT µ ρ .
Then there exists h: T
. We will show that f is a Nash equilibrium of G. Since τ is a N ED,
. Thus, f is a Nash equilibrium of G.
For the converse part. Now suppose for any LSGT G : Aliprantis-Border (2007, Theorem 4.41) . Denote the range of G by R(G). We first show that τ (graph of h) = 1. τ (graph of h) = τ ({ (t, v, h(t, v) ) : (t, v) ∈ R(G)}) + τ ({(t, v, h(t, v) ) : (t, v) ∈ R(G)}) ≥ τ ({(t, v, h(t, v) . Since f is a Nash equilibrium, graph of h ⊆ B(τ ) and τ (B(τ )) = 1. Therefore, τ is symmetrized.
Our last result furnishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the situation when a N ED of an atomless LDGT cannot be realized by the Lebesgue unit interval. Proof: It follows from Proposition 2 that a saturated space can realize any NED for any LDGT . We only need to show the sufficient part. Let τ be a non-symmetric N ED of an atomless LDGT . By Theorem 4, the Lebesgue unit interval (L, L, ) cannot realize τ . That is to say, the Lebesgue unit interval does not have the saturation property for τ . However, (I, I, λ) has the saturation property for τ . It follows from Keisler-Sun (2009, Theorem 2.7) that (I, I, λ) must be saturated.
